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Abstract
This paper formulates and studies a linear quadratic (LQ for short) game prob-
lem governed by linear stochastic Volterra integral equation. Sufficient and neces-
sary condition of the existence of saddle points for this problem are derived. As a
consequence we solve the problems left by Chen and Yong in [3]. Firstly, in our
framework, the term GX2(T ) is allowed to be appear in the cost functional and the
coefficients are allowed to be random. Secondly we study the unique solvability for
certain coupled forward-backward stochastic Volterra integral equations (FBSVIEs
for short) involved in this game problem. To characterize the condition aforemen-
tioned explicitly, some other useful tools, such as backward stochastic Fredholm-
Volterra integral equations (BSFVIEs for short) and stochastic Fredholm integral
equations (FSVIEs for short) are introduced. Some relations between them are
investigated. As a application, a linear quadratic stochastic differential game with
finite delay in the state variable and control variables is studied.
Keywords: Stochastic integral games, open-loop controls, saddle points, linear
quadratic optimal control problem, coupled forward-backward stochastic Volterra
integral equations, backward stochastic Fredholm-Volterra integral equation
1 Introduction
Differential game is a classical problem, there are several frameworks of investigating it
as far as the strategies are concerned; see [4], [7], [8], [10], [12] for open-loop strategies
of both deterministic and stochastic differential games, and [2], [5], [8], [10], [12], [21],
[22] for closed-loop strategy counterpart. In addition, we would also like to mention the
work of Fleming and Souganidis [6], who firstly gave a study on two-player zero-sum
stochastic differential games. Nonetheless there are few literature to demonstrate some
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analytical research on the more general dynamic setting, such as the system driven by
a Volterra equation. In this connection the only paper we know is You [29], where the
problem is spread out in the deterministic setting. Such a lack of study is certainly not
due to the unimportance and non-interestingness of the problem, rather it is because,
we believe, that most of the effective techniques in the conventional differential game
are not analyzable and applicable well in such setting. For example, as compared with
differential dynamic system, the time-consistency (or semi-group) property is failure in
the Volterra integral case, thus many good results along this no longer hold.
In this paper, we will initiate a study on zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ for short)
stochastic integral game. A particularly important notion for investigating the problem
is given by Nash equilibria. Loosely speaking, in the game problem, Player 1 wishes to
minimize the quadratic performance (4) which represents the cost and Player 2 wishes
to maximize (4) which represents the payoff. Since both of the two players are non-
cooperative, they would like to seek their admissible controls û1 and û2, respectively,
such that
J(û1, u2) ≤ J(û1, û2) ≤ J(u1, û2), (1)
for all the admissible controls u1 and u2. The reason for (1) holds is that none of the
players can improve his/her outcome J(û1, û2) by deviating from û1 or û2 unilaterally.
Thus both players will be satisfied with the controls û1 and û2, respectively. In our
framework, we refer to (û1, û2) as an open-loop saddle point of the game over [0, T ], and
we consider only the open loop strategies in the following part. Additionally, we point
out that in general, an open-loop saddle point (if it exists) is not necessarily unique.
Before demonstrating the model we will study in this paper, we would like to sum-
marize how our work relates to the literature on which it builds. One of the main results
is establishing the relation between the LQ stochastic integral game aforementioned and
backward stochastic Volterra integral equations (BSVIEs for short), which is based on
the results in [3], nonetheless in a much more general setting. First the two-player
nature of the game problem demands more delicate manipulations of all the involved
Hilbert operators. Secondly we solve a problem left by Chen and Yong in [3] since here
the term GX2(T ) is allowed to appear in the cost functional (4). As a consequence,
our paper naturally relates to the BSVIEs theoretic literature. The unique solvability
of BSVIEs was firstly studied by Lin [12], see also [24] for later related research. As to
the following general form,
Y (t) = ψ(t) +
∫ T
t
g(t, s, Y (s), Z(t, s), Z(s, t))ds −
∫ T
t
Z(t, s)dW (s), (2)
we should mention the contribution of Yong ([26], [27]), who firstly introduced the no-
tion of adapted M-solution in [27] and established a Pontryagin type maximum principle
for optimal control of stochastic Volterra integral equations with the help of M-solution.
Moreover, as shown by Yong in [28], a class of continuous-time dynamic convex and
coherent risk measures can be derived via certain BSVIEs. Along this we also refer the
reader to [18], [23] for some other studies on this topic.
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In a deterministic setting, the game problem for an input-output system governed
by Volterra integral equation of the form
X(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
[B1(t, s)u1(s) +C1(t, s)u2(s)]ds
with respect to a quadratic performance functional of the form
J(u1(·), u2(·)) = E
∫ T
0
[QX2(t) +R1u
2
1(t) +R2u
2
2(t)]dt+ EGX
2(T ),
was studied in [29]. In this context, X,u1 and u2 are deterministic functions. With this
interpretation, our problem here can be seen as a natural extension of the work in [29].
To our knowledge, the paper might be the first one for the stochastic quadratic integral
game. As to the causal feedback optimal control problem for deterministic Volterra
integral equation, we would like to mention the works in [29] and [17]. A new method
called projection causality to this problem was introduced. So when the system is
stochastic Volterra integral equation, how to provide a causal feedback implementation
of the optimal strategies is still a problem and we hope to study it in the future.
In the traditional stochastic differential game, coupled forward-backward stochastic
differential equations (FBSDEs for short) play an important role in the existence of the
open-loop saddle points, see for example [15], [25] and the reference cited therein. As to
the solvability of coupled FBSDEs, there have been burgeoning research interest in it,
see [1], [9], [14], whereas almost all the methods depend heavily on Itoˆ formula or the
time-consistent (or semi-group) property of differential equation. In our framework, we
will obtain the existence of an open loop saddle point of the quadratic integral game,
which is equivalent to the solvability of certain FBSVIE plus the convexity and con-
cavity of the cost functional below. Thus the solvability of coupled forward-backward
stochastic Volterra integral equations (FBSVIEs for short) should also play an impor-
tant role for the stochastic integral game we are tackling. However, the solvability for
FBSVIEs is more challenging as compared with the situations for FBSDEs aforemen-
tioned. On the one hand, many conventional and convenient approaches or conditions,
such as the four-steps method in [14], the monotonicity condition in [9], especially the
most important Itoˆ formula, all are absent in this case. On the other hand, become
of the lack of time-consistent property for BSVIEs (or FBSVIEs), we can not use the
induction directly as differential equation and more complicated things should be in-
volved, see the existence and uniqueness of M-solution of BSVIEs in [27] for detailed
accounts. Worse still, the coupling of there two factors greatly amplifies the difficulty
of the problem.
In this paper, given assumptions, we will establish the existence and uniqueness of
M-solution for coupled FBSVIEs (31), which will be involved in our game problem. As
mentioned earlier most of effective techniques in tackling the problem for differential
equation become failure, therefore, we have to carry out investigation from some other
basic and original views. By assuming that β is a constant, we can introduce a new
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equivalent norm for M-solutions of FBSVIEs as follows
‖(x(·), y(·), z(·, ·))‖2H2[0,T ]×L2
F
[0,T ]
= E
[∫ T
0
e−βs|x(s)|2ds+
∫ T
0
eβs|y(s)|2ds+
∫ T
0
eβt
∫ T
0
|z(t, s)|2dsdt
]
,
thereby study the unique existence by means of fixed point theorem. This is a common
trick employed in the conventional BSDEs case, which also enables us to get around
the inapplicability of Itoˆ formula in the current setting. It is also worthy to claim that
we do not need more assumptions, such as the monotonicity condition in [9], except
the Lipschitz condition. Thus this can be seen as another contribution of this paper.
Notice that as to general form of coupled FBSVIEs, see (32) below, there is hitherto
no well technology to deal with, and it is an object of endeavor for us in the future.
One substantial difficulty, we believe, was caused by the appearance of X(T ) in the
two backward equations of (32). However, in certain special case, we can transform
the unique solvability of FBSVIE (32) into the solvability of some kind of backward
stochastic Fredholm-Volterra integral equation (BSFVIE for short), allowing the ap-
pearance of X(T ). More importantly, under some assumptions, the aforementioned
BSFVIE becomes a forward stochastic Fredholm-Volterra integral equation (SFVIE for
short), and this helps us to characterize the Nash equilibrium strategy more explicitly.
We refer the readers to [20] and [22] for details on the solvability of SFVIEs. As to
the case for BSFVIE, the problem is much more complicated and we hope to study it
in the future. At last we will illustrate the application of the obtained results to the
stochastic quadratic differential game with delay.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the game
problem will be formulated and some preliminary results will also be stated. In Section 3
we study the LQ integral games in Hilbert space and obtain one necessary and sufficient
condition of existence of saddle point. In Section 4 we will make use of BSVIEs (or
FBSVIEs) to characterize the result derived in Section 3 more explicitly. In Section 5
we give another sufficient condition with the help of the solvability of M-solution for
coupled FBSVIE (26). Some further considerations, such as the relationship between
coupled FBSVIEs, BSFVIEs and SFVIEs are investigated. At last we give some results
of stochastic differential game with delay and obtain one explicit expression of the saddle
point, which is consistent with the result in [29].
2 Problem formulation and preliminary
Let (Wt)t∈[0,T ] be a scalar-valued Wiener process defined on a probability space (Ω,F , P )
and (Ft)t∈[0,T ] denotes the natural filtration of (Wt), such that F0 contains all P -null
sets of F . Our assumption that W (·) is scalar-valued is for the sake of simplicity and
no essential difficulties are encountered when extending our analysis to the case of
vector-valued Brownian motion.
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Suppose the dynamic of a stochastic system is described by a controlled linear
stochastic Volterra integral equation (SVIE for short),
X(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
[A1(t, s)X(s) +B1(t, s)u1(s) + C1(t, s)u2(s)]ds
+
∫ t
0
[A2(t, s)X(s) +B2(t, s)u1(s) + C2(t, s)u2(s)]dW (s), (3)
where u1 and u2 are adapted and stand for, respectively the intervention functions of
two agents Play 1 and Play 2 on the dynamic system. X is the state process and u1
and u2 are control processes taken by two players. To avoid undue technicality, we
assume both the state process and control process are scalar-valued. We define the
cost functional associated with (3) for the players as follows:
J(u1(·), u2(·)) = E
∫ T
0
f(t,X(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt+ EGX
2(T ),
where
f(t,X(t), u1(t), u2(t))
= Q(t)X2(t) + 2S1(t)X(t)u1(t) + 2S2(t)X(t)u2(t) +R11(t)u
2
1(t)
+R12(t)u1(t)u2(t) +R21(t)u1(t)u2(t) +R22(t)u
2
2(t)
=
〈 Q(t) S1(t) S2(t)S1(t) R11(t) R12(t)
S2(t) R21(t) R22(t)
 X(t)u1(t)
u2(t)
 ,
 X(t)u1(t)
u2(t)
〉
2
.
Note that 〈·, ·〉2 is defined blew. In what follows, we will denote
S(t) =
(
S1(t)
S2(t)
)
, R(t) =
[
R11(t) R12(t)
R21(t) R22(t)
]
, u(t) =
(
u1(t)
u2(t)
)
,
and
J(u1(·), u2(·))
= E
∫ T
0
[Q(t)X2(t) + 2X(t)S(t) · u(t) +R(t)u(t) · u(t)]dt+ EGX2(T )
= 〈QX,X〉2 + 2 〈XS, u〉2 + 〈Ru, u〉2 + E 〈GX(T ),X(T )〉1 . (4)
Throughout this paper, we assume that Q, Rij and Si (i, j = 1, 2) are bounded adapted
processes and G is a bounded random variable. Note that in the above model, the
controls are allowed to appear in both the drift and diffusion of the state equation, the
weighting matrices in the payoff/cost functional are not assumed to be definite/non-
singular, and the cross-terms between two controls are allowed to appear, we refer this
problem as a so-called zero-sum linear quadratic stochastic integral game.
Next we will give some notations. We denote ∆c = {t, s) ∈ [0, T ]2; t ≤ s} and
∆ = [0, T ]2 ∆c. Let L2(Ω× [0, T ]) be the set of the processes X : [0, T ]×Ω→ R which
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is B([0, T ]) × FT -measurable satisfying E
∫ T
0 |X(t)|
2dt < ∞. L2(Ω) is set of random
variable ξ : Ω → R which is FT -measurable satisfying E|ξ|
2 < ∞, and we denote its
inner product by 〈·, ·〉1 . ∀R,S ∈ [0, T ], L
2
F [R,S] is the set of all adapted processes
X : [R,S] × Ω → R such that E
∫ S
R
|X(t)|2dt < ∞, and we denote its inner product
by 〈·, ·〉2 . L
2(R,S;L2F [R,S]) be the set of all process Z : [R,S]
2 × Ω → R such that
for almost all t ∈ [R,S], Z(t, ·) is F-adapted satisfying E
∫ S
R
∫ S
R
|Z(t, s)|2dsdt < ∞.
We denote H2[R,S] = L2F [R,S] × L
2(R,S;L2F [R,S]). L
∞[0, T ] is set of deterministic
function X : [0, T ] × Ω → R such that sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X(t)| < ∞. L2(0, T ;L∞[0, T ]) is set of
deterministic function X : [0, T ]2 → R such that for almost t ∈ [0, T ], sup
s∈[0,T ]
|X(t, s)| <
∞. L2(0, T ;L2[0, T ]) is set of deterministic function X : [0, T ]2 → R such that for
almost t ∈ [0, T ],
∫ T
0
∫ T
0 |X(t, s)|
2ds < ∞. As to L∞
F
[0, T ], L∞(0, T ;L2
F
[0, T ]) and
L∞(0, T ;L∞
F
[0, T ]), we can define them in a similar manner.
The notion of M-solutions of BSVIEs can be expressed as,
Definition 2.1 Let S ∈ [0, T ]. A pair of (Y (·), Z(·, ·)) ∈ H2[S, T ] is called an adapted
M-solution of BSVIE (2) on [S, T ] if (2) holds in the usual Itoˆ’s sense for almost all
t ∈ [S, T ] and in addition, the following holds:
Y (t) = EFSY (t) +
∫ t
S
Z(t, s)dW (s), t ∈ [S, T ].
In [27], the author gave the definition of M-solution of BSVIE in H2[0, T ] and proved
the following proposition,
Proposition 2.1 Let g : ∆c × R × R × R × Ω → R be B(∆c × R × R × R) ⊗ FT -
measurable such that s→ g(t, s, y, z, ζ) is F-progressively measurable for all (t, y, z, ζ) ∈
[0, T ] × R × R × R, moreover, g satisfies the Lipschitz conditions, ∀y, y ∈ R, z, z, ζ,
ζ ∈ R,
|g(t, s, y, z, ζ) − g(t, s, y, z, ζ)| ≤ L(t, s)(|y − y|+ |z − z|+ |ζ − ζ|),
where (t, s) ∈ ∆c, ∆c =
{
(t, s) ∈ [0, T ]2 | t ≤ s
}
, L(t, s) is a determined non-negative
function satisfying sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
t
L2+ǫ(t, s)ds < ∞, for some ǫ > 0. Then (2) admits a
unique M-solution in H2[0, T ].
3 Stochastic LQ integral games in Hilbert spaces
In this section the linear quadratic stochastic integral games problem is formulated in
Hilbert space. It is important to recognize that the classical LQ stochastic differential
games and LQ optimal control problem for FSVIEs can also be treated similarly in
infinite dimensional space, see [15] and [3]. We incorporate some useful techniques in
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Chen and Yong [3], but investigate the problem in a more general framework. On the
one hand, the coefficients, in both state equation and cost functional, are allowed to
be random, moreover, the form of cost functional is general, especially allowing the
appearance of the term GX2(T ). On the other hand, the nature of game problem also
demand more delicate analysis of the operators involved. To start with, we need to
make some preliminary.
LetH be a Hilbert space and Θ : D(Θ) ⊆ H → H be a self-adjoint operator, i.e., it is
densely defined and closed but not necessarily bounded. We denote R(Θ) and N (Θ) to
be the range and kernel of Θ, respectively. Since Θ is self-adjoint, N (Θ)⊥ = R(Θ) and
we have Θ
(
D(Θ)
⋂
R(Θ)
)
⊆ R(Θ). Thus under the decomposition H = N (Θ)⊕R(Θ),
we have the following representation for Θ : Θ =
(
0 0
0 Θ̂
)
, where Θ̂ : D(Θ)
⋂
R(Θ) ⊆
R(Θ)→R(Θ) is self-adjoint (again, it is densely defined and closed, but not necessarily
bounded, on the Hilbert space R(Θ)). Now we define the pseudo-inverse Θ† by the
following: Θ† =
(
0 0
0 Θ̂−1
)
, with domain
D(Θ†) = N (Θ) +R(Θ) ≡ {u0 + u1 | u0 ∈ N (Θ), u1 ∈ R(Θ)} ⊇ R(Θ).
LetH = H1×H2 withH1 andH2 being two Hilbert spaces, and we consider a quadratic
functional on H : for any u = (u1, u2), v ∈ H,
J(u) ≡ J(u1, u2) = 〈Θu, u〉+ 2 〈v, u〉
≡
〈(
Θ11 Θ12
Θ21 Θ22
)(
u1
u2
)
,
(
u1
u2
)〉
+2
〈(
v1
v2
)
,
(
u1
u2
)〉
.
Here Θij : Hj → Hi (i, j = 1, 2) is bounded operator, Θ ≡
(
Θ11 Θ12
Θ21 Θ22
)
is self-
adjoint. We have the proposition as follows:
Proposition 3.1 There exists a saddle point (û1, û2) ∈ H1×H2 for (u1, u2) 7→ J(u1, u2),
that is,
J(û1, u2) ≤ J(û1, û2) ≤ J(u1, û2),∀(u1, u2) ∈ H1 ×H2,
if and only if v ∈ R(Θ) and the following are true: Θ11 ≥ 0 (it means that ∀u1 ∈
H1, 〈Θ11u1, u1〉H1 ≥ 0), Θ22 ≤ 0 (it means that ∀u2 ∈ H2, 〈Θ22u2, u2〉H2 ≤ 0). In the
above case, each saddle point û = (û1, û2) ∈ H1 × H2 is a solution of the equation:
Θû+ v = 0, and it admits a representation: û = −Θ†v + (I −Θ†Θ)v˜, for some v˜ ∈ H.
Moreover, û is unique if and only if N (Θ) = {0}.
Proof. We refer the reader to see the proof in [15] or [3]. ✷
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The above argument indicates that we could discuss the quadratic integral game by
using certain Hilbert operators. Before going further, we need the following standing
assumptions which is in force in the rest of the paper.
(H1) A1 ∈ L
∞(0, T ;L2
F
[0, T ]), A2(·, ·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;L∞
F
[0, T ]), Bi(t, s) and Ci(t, s)
(i = 1, 2) also satisfy the similar assumption.
For any (X,u1, u2) ∈ L
2
F [0, T ]×L
2
F [0, T ]×L
2
F [0, T ], we can define the operators A,
B1, C1 from L
2
F [0, T ] to itself as follows:
(AX)(t) =
∫ t
0
A1(t, s)X(s)ds +
∫ t
0
A2(t, s)X(s)dW (s),
(B1u1)(t) =
∫ t
0
B1(t, s)u1(s)ds +
∫ t
0
B2(t, s)u1(s)dW (s),
(C1u2)(t) =
∫ t
0
C1(t, s)u2(s)ds +
∫ t
0
C2(t, s)u2(s)dW (s),
thus we have
X(t) = ϕ(t) + (AX)(t) + (B1u1)(t) + (C1u2)(t).
The following lemma character the well property of the operators defined above.
Lemma 3.1 Let (H1) hold, then the operators A, B1 and C1 are bounded operators
and A is quasi-nilpotent, i.e., lim
k→∞
∥∥Ak∥∥ 1k = 0. Consequently, (I −A)−1 : L2F [0, T ] →
L2F [0, T ] is bounded, hence, for any ϕ(·) ∈ L
2
F [0, T ] and u1, u2 ∈ L
2
F [0, T ], (3) admits a
unique solution X = (I −A)−1(ϕ+ B1u1 + C1u2).
Proof. The proof is essentially resembles the one in [3] and we omit it here. ✷
Due to the appearance of GX2(T ), some other operators are also required to tackle
it. We denote
∆TX =
∫ T
0
A1(T, s)X(s)ds +
∫ T
0
A2(T, s)X(s)dW (s),
ΛTu1 =
∫ T
0
B1(T, s)u1(s)ds+
∫ T
0
B2(T, s)u1(s)dW (s),
ΠTu2 =
∫ T
0
C1(T, s)u2(s)ds +
∫ T
0
C2(T, s)u2(s)dW (s),
hence
X(T ) = ∆TX + ΛTu1 +ΠTu2 + ϕ(T ).
Obviously ∆T , ΛT and ΠT are bounded operators from L
2
F [0, T ] to L
2(Ω).
In what follows, we make some conventions as,
(Uu)(t) = (B1u1)(t) + (C1u2)(t), ΓTu = ΛTu1 +ΠTu2,
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therefore,
Uu = (B1, C1)
(
u1
u2
)
= (B1, C1)u, (5)
ΓTu = (ΛT ,ΠT )
(
u1
u2
)
= (ΛT ,ΠT )u. (6)
We define the operators Q, S and R as follows: for i, j = 1, 2,
〈QX,X〉2 = E
∫ T
0
Q(t)X2(t)dt, 〈SX,u〉2 = E
∫ T
0
S(t)X(t) · u(t)dt,
〈Ru, u〉2 = E
∫ T
0
R(t)u(t) · u(t)dt, 〈SiX,ui〉2 = E
∫ T
0
Si(t)X(t)ui(t)dt,
〈Ri,jui, uj〉2 = E
∫ T
0
Ri,j(t)ui(t) · uj(t)dt,
consequently,
S =
(
S1
S2
)
, R =
(
R11 R12
R21 R22
)
, (7)
and (4) can be rewritten as
J(u) = 〈QX,X〉2 + 2 〈SX,u〉2 + 〈Ru, u〉2 + 〈GX(T ),X(T )〉1 . (8)
Now we turn to deal with 〈GX(T ),X(T )〉1 by means of the operators defined previously.
〈GX(T ),X(T )〉1
= 〈G(∆TX + ΓTu+ ϕ(T )),∆TX + ΓTu+ ϕ(T )〉1
= 〈∆∗TG∆TX,X〉2 + 2 〈Γ
∗
TG∆TX,u〉2 + 〈Γ
∗
TGΓTu, u〉2
+2 〈X,∆∗TGϕ(T )〉2 + 2 〈u,Γ
∗
TGϕ(T )〉2 + 〈ϕ(T ), ϕ(T )〉1 , (9)
where ∀η ∈ L2(Ω), X, u ∈ L2F [0, T ],
〈∆TX, η〉1 = 〈X,∆
∗
T η〉2 , 〈ΓTu, η〉1 = 〈u,Γ
∗
T η〉2 .
If we denote
Q′ = Q+∆∗TG∆T , S
′ = S + Γ∗TG∆T , R
′ = R+ Γ∗TGΓT , (10)
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then we can obtain the following expressions after substituting (9) into (8),
J(u) =
〈
Q′X,X
〉
2
+ 2
〈
S ′X,u
〉
2
+
〈
R′u, u
〉
2
+2 〈X,∆∗TGϕ(T )〉2 + 2 〈u,Γ
∗
TGϕ(T )〉2 + 〈ϕ(T ), ϕ(T )〉1
=
〈(
Q′ S ′∗
S ′ R′
)(
(I −A)−1(ϕ+ Uu)
u
)
,
(
(I −A)−1(ϕ+ Uu)
u
)〉
2
+2
〈
(I −A)−1(ϕ+ Uu),∆∗TGϕ(T )
〉
2
+ 2 〈u,Γ∗TGϕ(T )〉2 + 〈ϕ(T ), ϕ(T )〉1
=
〈(
Q′ S
′∗T
S ′ R′
)(
(I −A)−1 (I −A)−1U
0 I
)(
ϕ
u
)
,(
(I −A)−1 (I −A)−1U
0 I
)(
ϕ
u
)〉
2
+2
〈
u,U∗(I −A∗)−1∆∗TGϕ(T ) + Γ
∗
TGϕ(T )
〉
2
+2
〈
(I −A)−1ϕ,∆∗TGϕ(T )
〉
+ 〈ϕ(T ), ϕ(T )〉1
= 〈Θu, u〉2 + 〈Θ1ϕ, u〉2 + 〈Θ2ϕ,ϕ〉2
+2
〈
(I −A)−1ϕ,∆∗TGϕ(T )
〉
+ 〈ϕ(T ), ϕ(T )〉1 ,
where
Θ = (U∗T (I −A∗)−1Q′+S ′)(I −A)−1U + U∗T (I −A∗)−1S ′∗T +R′,
Θ1ϕ = (U
∗T (I −A∗)−1Q′+S ′)(I −A)−1ϕ+ U∗T (I −A∗)−1∆∗TGϕ(T ) + Γ
∗
TGϕ(T ),
Θ2 = (I −A
∗)−1Q′(I −A)−1. (11)
In above, AT is the transpose of A. From (5), (6) and (10) we have
(U∗T (I −A∗)−1Q′+S ′)(I −A)−1U
=
(
B∗1
C∗1
)
(I −A∗)−1Q′(I −A)−1(B1, C1)
+
(
S1
S2
)
(I −A)−1(B1, C1) +
(
Λ∗T
Π∗T
)
G∆T (I −A)
−1(B1, C1),
and
U∗T (I −A∗)−1S ′∗T =
(
B∗1
C∗1
)
(I −A∗)−1 [(S∗1 ,S
∗
2 ) + ∆
∗
TG(ΛT ,ΠT )] ,
so we have
Θ =
(
Θ11 Θ12
Θ21 Θ22
)
,
where
Θ11 = B
∗
1(I −A
∗)−1Q′(I −A)−1B1 + S1(I −A)
−1B1 + Λ
∗
TG∆T (I −A)
−1B1
+B∗1(I −A
∗)−1(S∗1 +∆
∗
TGΛT ) +R11 + Λ
∗
TGΛT , (12)
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and
Θ22 = C
∗
1(I −A
∗)−1Q′(I −A)−1C1 + S2(I −A)
−1C1 +Π
∗
TG∆T (I −A)
−1C1
+C∗1(I −A
∗)−1(S∗2 +∆
∗
TGΠT ) +R22 +Π
∗
TGΠT . (13)
To conclude this section, we state a necessary and sufficient condition of existence of
saddle point for open-loop game with the help of Proposition 3.1 and the operators
above.
Theorem 3.1 Let (H1) hold, for given ϕ(·) ∈ L2F [0, T ], the open-loop game admits a
saddle point û ≡ (û1, û2) if and only if Θ11 ≥ 0, Θ22 ≤ 0 and Θ1ϕ ∈ R(Θ), where Θ11
and Θ22 are defined by (12) and (13). In this case, any saddle point û is a solution
of the following equation: Θu + Θ1ϕ = 0 with Θ1ϕ defined in (11), and it admits the
following representation:
û = −Θ†Θ1ϕ+ (I −Θ
†Θ)v,
for some v ∈ L2F [0, T ] × L
2
F [0, T ]. In addition, the saddle point is unique if and only if
N (Θ) = {0}.
The proof is obvious and we omit it here. Note that here Θ11 ≥ 0, Θ22 ≤ 0 is equivalent
to the convexity of u1 7→ J0(u1, 0) and the concavity of u2 7→ J0(0, u2), where J0(u) is
the value of J(u) when ϕ ≡ 0.
4 Open-loop games via BSVIE
In this section, to further characterize explicitly the sufficient and necessary condition
in Theorem 3.1, we will make use of an efficient tool, i.e., BSVIEs aforementioned.
Two equivalent conditions correspondent to the one in Theorem 3.1 are proposed and
analyzed via BSVIEs. The method is designed around the scheme in [3] but with some
more delicate and sophisticated analysis involved. At the outset, we need to prove some
lemmas needed in the sequel.
Lemma 4.1 Let (H1) hold. Then for any ρ(·) ∈ L2F [0, T ], (A
∗ρ)(t) = σ(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
where
σ(t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[A1(s, t)ρ(s) +A2(s, t)ν(s, t)]ds,
ρ(t) = Eρ(t) +
∫ t
0
ν(t, s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ]. (14)
Similarly we have ∀ui ∈ L
2
F [0, T ], (i = 1, 2), (B
∗
1u1)(t) = α(t), (C
∗
1u2)(t) = γ(t),
t ∈ [0, T ], where
α(t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[B1(s, t)u1(s) +B2(s, t)β(s, t)]ds,
u1(t) = Eu1(t) +
∫ t
0
β(t, s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ],
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and
γ(t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[C1(s, t)u2(s) + C2(s, t)δ(s, t)]ds,
u2(t) = Eu2(t) +
∫ t
0
δ(t, s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Since A is a bounded linear operator from the Hilbert space L2F [0, T ] into itself,
thus the adjoint operator A∗ of A is well-defined. For any X(·) ∈ L2F [0, T ],
E
∫ T
0
(A∗ρ)(t)X(t)dt ≡ E
∫ T
0
ρ(t)(AX)(t)dt
= E
∫ T
0
ρ(t)dt
∫ t
0
A1(t, s)X(s)ds + E
∫ T
0
ρ(t)dt
∫ t
0
A2(t, s)X(s)dW (s)
= E
∫ T
0
X(t)dt
∫ T
t
A1(s, t)ρ(s)ds + E
∫ T
0
X(t)dt
∫ T
t
A2(s, t)ν(s, t)ds
= E
∫ T
0
X(t)dtEFt
∫ T
t
[A1(s, t)ρ(s) +A2(s, t)ν(s, t)]ds,
where we use the relation ρ(t) = Eρ(t)+
∫ t
0 ν(t, s)dW (s) and stochastic Fubini theorem
above, thus by the arbitrariness of X, we get (14). As to the other two results, the
proof is similar. ✷
Remark 4.1 Let us consider the following equation:
Y (t) = ψ(t) +
∫ T
t
[A1(s, t)Y (s) +A2(s, t)Z(s, t)]ds −
∫ T
t
Z(t, s)dW (s), (15)
where (Y (·), Z(·, ·)) is the unique M-solution of (15) and ψ ∈ L2(Ω × [0, T ]). From
Lemma 4.1, we know that Y = EFtψ + A∗Y. Since (I − A)−1 exists and bounded, we
have Y = (I −A∗)−1EFtψ.
Lemma 4.2 Let (H1) hold. Then ∀η ∈ L2(Ω), we have
(∆∗T η)(s) = A1(T, s)E
Fsη +A2(T, s)θ(s),
η = Eη +
∫ T
0
θ(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ]. (16)
Similarly ∀ζi ∈ L
2(Ω), (i = 1, 2), we have
(Λ∗T ζ1)(s) = B1(T, s)E
Fsζ1 +B2(T, s)κ1(s),
ζ1 = Eζ1 +
∫ T
0
κ1(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ],
and
(Π∗T ζ2)(s) = C1(T, s)E
Fsζ2 + C2(T, s)κ2(s),
ζ2 = Eζ2 +
∫ T
0
κ2(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ].
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Proof. Because ∆ is a bounded linear operator from the Hilbert space L2F [0, T ] into
L2(Ω), thus the adjoint operator ∆∗ of ∆, which is defined from L2(Ω) into L2F [0, T ],
is well-defined. For any η ∈ L2(Ω), X ∈ L2F [0, T ], we have
E
∫ T
0
(∆∗T η)(s)X(s)ds = 〈∆
∗
T η,X〉2 = 〈η,∆TX〉1 = Eη∆TX
= E
∫ T
0
A1(T, s)ηX(s)ds +E
∫ T
0
A2(T, s)X(s)ηdW (s)
= E
∫ T
0
A1(T, s)ηX(s)ds +E
∫ T
0
A2(T, s)θ(s)X(s)ds
= E
∫ T
0
[A1(T, s)η +A2(T, s)θ(s)]X(s)ds
= E
∫ T
0
[A1(T, s)E
Fsη +A2(T, s)θ(s)]X(s)ds. (17)
Since X(·) ∈ L2F [0, T ] is arbitrary, it follows from (17) that,
(∆∗T η)(s) = A1(T, s)E
Fsη +A2(T, s)θ(s).
As to the others, the proof is similar. ✷
The previous two lemmas show the way to express the Hilbert operators more
clearly. The following two theorems are the two main results in this section, which are
established with the help of the two lemmas above.
Theorem 4.1 Let (H1) hold, then for i = 1, 2, and any ui(·) ∈ L
2
F [0, T ], (X
u1 , Y u1 , Zu1 , λu1)
is the unique M-solution of the following decoupled FBSVIE:
Xu1(t) =
∫ t
0
[A1(t, s)X
u1(t) +B1(t, s)u1(s)]ds
+
∫ t
0
[A2(t, s)X
u1(t) +B2(t, s)u1(s)]dW (s),
Y u1(t) = Q(t)Xu1(t) + S1(t)u1(t) +A1(T, t)GX
u1(T ) +A2(T, t)θ1(t)
+
∫ T
t
[A1(s, t)Y
u1(s) +A2(s, t)Z
u1(s, t)]ds −
∫ T
t
Zu1(t, s)dW (s),
λu1(t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[B1(s, t)Y
u1(s) +B2(s, t)Z
u1(s, t)]ds,
(18)
and (Xu2 , Y u2 , Zu2 , λu2) is the unique M-solution of the following decoupled FBSVIE:
Xu2(t) =
∫ t
0
[A1(t, s)X
u2(t) + C1(t, s)u2(s)]ds
+
∫ t
0
[A2(t, s)X
u2(t) + C2(t, s)u2(s)]dW (s),
Y u2(t) = Q(t)Xu2(t) + S2(t)u2(t) +A1(T, t)GX
u2(T ) +A2(T, t)θ2(t)
+
∫ T
t
[A1(s, t)Y
u2(s) +A2(s, t)Z
u2(s, t)]ds −
∫ T
t
Zu2(t, s)dW (s),
λu2(t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[C1(s, t)Y
u1(s) + C2(s, t)Z
u2(s, t)]ds,
(19)
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where i = 1, 2,
GXui(T ) = EGXui(T ) +
∫ T
0
θi(s)dW (s).
Then Θ11 ≥ 0 is equivalent to: ∀u1(t) ∈ L
2
F [0, T ],
E
∫ T
0
[λu1(s) + S1(s)X
u1(s) +R11(s)u1(s)]u1(s)ds
+E
∫ T
0
[B1(T, s)E
FsGXu1(T ) +B2(T, s)θ1(s)]u1(s)ds ≥ 0, (20)
and Θ22 ≤ 0 is equivalent to: ∀u2(t) ∈ L
2
F [0, T ],
E
∫ T
0
[λu2(s) + S2(s)X
u2(s) +R22(s)u2(s)]u2(s)ds
+E
∫ T
0
[C1(T, s)E
FsGXu2(T ) + C2(T, s)θ2(s)]u2(s)ds ≤ 0. (21)
Proof. It is clear that ∀u1(t) ∈ L
2
F [0, T ],
B∗1(I −A
∗)−1(Q′(I −A)−1B1u1 + S
∗
1u1 +∆
∗
TGΛTu1)
= B∗1(I −A
∗)−1[(Q+∆∗TG∆T )(I −A)
−1B1u1 + S
∗
1u1 +∆
∗
TGΛTu1]
= B∗1(I −A
∗)−1(QXu1 + S1u1 +∆
∗
TGX
u1(T )),
and
S1(I −A)
−1B1u1 +R11u1 + Λ
∗
TG∆T (I −A)
−1B1u1 + Λ
∗
TGΛTu1
= S1X
u1 +R11u1 + Λ
∗
TGX
u1(T ),
where Xu1(t) and Xu1(T ) can be expressed by
Xu1(t) =
∫ t
0
B1(t, s)u1(s)ds+
∫ t
0
B2(t, s)u1(s)dW (s)
+
∫ t
0
A1(t, s)X
u1(s)ds +
∫ t
0
A2(t, s)X
u1(s)dW (s),
Xu1(T ) =
∫ T
0
B1(T, s)u1(s)ds+
∫ T
0
B2(T, s)u1(s)dW (s)
+
∫ T
0
A1(T, s)X
u1(s)ds +
∫ T
0
A2(T, s)X
u1(s)dW (s),
thereby
(Θ11u) = B
∗
1(I −A
∗)−1[QXu1 + S1u1 +A1(T, ·)E
F·GXu1(T )
+A2(T, ·)θ1(·)] + S1X
u1 +R11u1
+B1(T, ·)E
F·GXu1(T ) +B2(T, ·)θ1(·),
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where
GXu1(T ) = EGXu1(T ) +
∫ T
0
θ1(s)dW (s).
By Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 we have
(Θ11u)(s) = λ
u1(s) + S1(s)X
u1(s) +R11(s)u1(s)
+B1(T, s)E
FsGXu1(T ) +B2(T, s)θ1(s),
where (Y u1 , Zu1 , λu1 is the unique M-solution of the following BSVIEs,
Y u1(t) = Q(t)Xu1(t) + S1(t)u1(t) +A1(T, t)E
FtGXu1(T ) +A2(T, t)θ1(t)
+
∫ T
t
[A1(s, t)Y
u1(s) +A2(s, t)Z
u1(s, t)]ds −
∫ T
t
Zu1(t, s)dW (s),
λu1(t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[B1(s, t)Y
u1(s) +B2(s, t)Z
u1(s, t)]ds.
(22)
In the similar method we have
(Θ22u) = C
∗
1(I −A
∗)−1[QXu2 + S2u2 +∆
∗
TGX
u2(T )]
+S2X
u2 +R22u2 +Π
∗
TGX
u2(T )
= λu2 + S2X
u2 +R22u2 + C1(T, s)E
F·GXu2(T ) + C2(T, ·)θ2(·),
and
GXu2(T ) = EGXu2(T ) +
∫ T
0
θ2(s)dW (s),
where (Y u2 , Zu2 , λu2 is the unique M-solution of the following BSVIEs,
Y u2(t) = QXu2(t) + S2u2(t) +A1(T, t)E
FtGXu2(T ) +A2(T, t)θ2(t)
+
∫ T
t
[A1(s, t)Y
u2(s) +A2(s, t)Z
u2(s, t)]ds −
∫ T
t
Zu2(t, s)dW (s),
λu2(t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[C1(s, t)Y
u2(s) + C2(s, t)Z
u2(s, t)]ds.
Hence the conclusion hold naturally. ✷
Note that (18) or (19) admits a unique M-solution (Xui , Y ui , Zui , λui) by which we
mean that (Y ui , Zui) is the unique M-solution of the second BSVIE and (Xui , λui) is
the unique adapted solution of the other two equations.
Theorem 4.2 Let (H1) hold, ϕ(·) ∈ L2F [0, T ], then
(Θu)(t) + (Θ1ϕ)(t) = λ(t) + (SX)(t)+(Ru)(t) + Ξ1(t)GX(T ) + Ξ2(t)θ(t),
where λ(·) satisfies
λ(t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[(
B1(s, t)
C1(s, t)
)
Y (s) +
(
B2(s, t)
C2(s, t)
)
Z(s, t)
]
ds, (23)
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Y (·) is the unique M-solution of BSVIE
Y (t) = Q(t)X(t) + ST (t)u(t) +A1(T, t)E
FtGX(T ) +A2(T, t)θ(t)
+
∫ T
t
[A1(s, t)Y (s) +A2(s, t)Z(s, t)]ds −
∫ T
t
Z(t, s)dW (s), (24)
GX(T ) = EGX(T ) +
∫ T
0 θ(s)dW (s), and X(t) is the unique solution of (3). Conse-
quently, the condition Θ1ϕ ∈ R(Θ) holds if and only if there is a û(·) such that
λ(t) + (SX)(t)+(Rû)(t) + Ξ1(t)GX(T ) + Ξ2(t)θ(t) = 0, (25)
where Ξi are defined below.
Proof. It follows from (11) that
(Θ1ϕ)(t) = [U
∗T (I −A∗)−1Q′(I −A)−1ϕ](t)+[S ′(I −A)−1ϕ](t)
+[U∗T (I −A∗)−1∆∗TGϕ(T )](t) + [Γ
∗
TGϕ(T )](t),
= U∗T (I −A∗)−1[(QXϕ)(t) + (∆∗TG∆TX
ϕ)(t) + (∆∗TGϕ(T ))(t)]
+(SXϕ)(t) + (Γ∗TG∆TX
ϕ)(t) + (Γ∗TGϕ(T ))(t),
where
Xϕ(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
A1(t, s)X
ϕ(s)ds+
∫ t
0
A2(t, s)X
ϕ(s)dW (s).
So we have
(Θu)(t) + (Θ1ϕ)(t)
= [U∗T (I −A∗)−1(QX + STu)](t)
+[U∗T (I −A∗)−1(∆∗TG∆TX +∆
∗
TGΓTu+∆
∗
TGϕ(T ))](t)
+(SX)(t) + (Γ∗TG∆TX)(t) + (Ru)(t) + (Γ
∗
TGΓTu)(t) + (Γ
∗
TGϕ(T ))(t)
= [U∗T (I −A∗)−1(QX + STu+∆∗TGX(T ))](t)
+(SX)(t)+(Ru)(t) + Ξ1(t)E
FtGX(T ) + Ξ2(t)θ(t)
= λ(t) + (SX)(t)+(Ru)(t) + Ξ1(t)E
FtGX(T ) + Ξ2θ(t),
where
Ξ1(t) =
(
B1(T, t)
C1(T, t)
)
, Ξ2(t) =
(
B2(T, t)
C2(T, t)
)
,
and λ(·) satisfies
λ(t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[(
B1(s, t)
C1(s, t)
)
Y (s) +
(
B2(s, t)
C2(s, t)
)
Z(s, t)
]
ds,
where Y (·) is the M-solution of BSVIE
Y (t) = Q(t)X(t) + ST (t)u(t) +A1(T, t)E
FtGX(T ) +A2(T, t)θ(t)
+
∫ T
t
[A1(s, t)Y (s) +A2(s, t)Z(s, t)]ds −
∫ T
t
Z(t, s)dW (s),
16
and θ(·) is determined by
GX(T ) = EGX(T ) +
∫ T
0
θ(t)dW (t).
Then the conclusion follows. ✷
5 Stochastic integral games and coupled FBSIVEs
5.1 A sufficient condition for existence of saddle point
In this subsection, under certain assumptions, a sufficient condition for the existence of
saddle point û will be given via coupled FBSVIEs. To begin with, we should investigate
the solvability the following coupled FBSVIE on [0, T ],
X(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
[A1(t, s)X(s) +B1(t, s)P (s)]ds
+
∫ t
0
[A2(t, s)X(s) +B2(t, s)P (s)]dW (s),
Y (t) = φ1(t)X(t) + φ2(t)P (t) +
∫ T
t
C1(s, t)Y (s)ds
+
∫ T
t
C2(s, t)Z(s, t)ds −
∫ T
t
Z(t, s)dW (s),
P (t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[D1(s, t)Y (s) +D2(s, t)Z(s, t)]ds.
(26)
We will show that it admits a unique M-solution by which we mean that (X,Y,Z, P )
satisfies the FBSVIEs in the usual sense and moreover the following hold, Y (t) =
EY (t)+
∫ t
0 Z(t, s)dW (s). Note that the generator in the second equation is independent
of Z(t, s) with (t, s) ∈ ∆c, we can transform the above FBSVIE into anther form
X(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
A1(t, s)X(s)ds +
∫ t
0
A2(t, s)X(s)dW (s)
+
∫ t
0
B1(t, s)
(
EFs
∫ T
s
[D1(u, s)Y (u)du+D2(u, s)Z(u, s)]du
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
B2(t, s)
(
EFs
∫ T
s
[D1(u, s)Y (u)du+D2(u, s)Z(u, s)]du
)
dW (s),
Y (t) = φ1(t)X(t) + E
Ft
∫ T
t
C ′1(s, t)Y (s)ds+ E
Ft
∫ T
t
C ′2(s, t)Z(s, t)ds,
(27)
where C ′1(s, t) = C1(s, t) + φ2(t)D1(s, t), and C
′
2(s, t) = C2(s, t) + φ2(t)D2(s, t). Next
we turn to study FBSVIE (27) rather than (26). Basic assumptions imposed on the
parameters in the above equation are summarized as follows,
(H2) Ai(Bi) : ∆ × Ω 7→ R (Ci,Di : ∆
c × Ω 7→ R, respectively) is B(∆) ⊗ FT -
measurable (B(∆c) ⊗ FT −measurable, respectively) such that s → Ai(t, s)(Bi(t, s))
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(s → Ci(s, t)(Di(s, t)), respectively) is F- progressively measurable for all t ∈ [0, T ],
(i = 1, 2), ϕ(·) ∈ L2F [0, T ], φi (i = 1, 2) is deterministic function. We assume that for
any t ≥ s,
|A1(t, s)| ≤ K1(t, s), |A2(t, s)| ≤ K2(t, s),
|B1(t, s)| ≤ e
βsK3(t, s), |B2(t, s)| ≤ e
βsK4(t, s),
and for any t ≤ s
|C1(t, s)| ≤ K5(t, s), |C2(t, s)| ≤ K6(t, s),
φ2(t)|D1(t, s)| ≤ K7(t, s), φ2(t)|D2(t, s)| ≤ K8(t, s),
where q > 2 is a constant, |φ1(t)| ≤
1
2e
−βt with β > 1 being a constant and
M1 = sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ t
0
K21 (t, s) <∞, M3 = sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ t
0
K23 (t, s) <∞,
M2 = sup
(t,s)∈∆
K2(t, s) <∞, M4 = sup
(t,s)∈∆
K4(t, s),
M5 = sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
t
K25 (s, t)ds <∞, M6 = sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
t
K
q
6(s, t)ds <∞,
M7 = sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
t
K27 (s, t)ds <∞, M8 = sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
t
K
q
8(s, t)ds <∞.
Theorem 5.1 Let (H2) hold, then FBSVIE (27) admits a unique M-solution.
Proof. Let M2[0, T ] be the set of element (Y,Z) in H2[0, T ] such that
Y (t) = EY (t) +
∫ t
0
Z(t, s)dW (s), (t, s) ∈ ∆.
It is easy to see that M2[0, T ] is a closed subspace of H2[0, T ], see [27]. We consider
the following equation
X(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
A1(t, s)x(s)ds +
∫ t
0
A2(t, s)x(s)dW (s)
+
∫ t
0
B1(t, s)
(
EFs
∫ T
s
[D1(u, s)y(u)du +D2(u, s)z(u, s)]du
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
B2(t, s)
(
EFs
∫ T
s
[D1(u, s)y(u)du +D2(u, s)z(u, s)]du
)
dW (s),
Y (t) = φ1(t)x(t) + E
Ft
∫ T
t
C ′1(s, t)y(s)ds + E
Ft
∫ T
t
C ′2(s, t)z(s, t)ds,
(28)
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for any ϕ(·) ∈ L2F [0, T ], and (x(·), y(·), z(·, ·)) ∈ L
2
F [0, T ] ×M
2[0, T ]. Obviously (28)
admits a unique adapted M-solution (X(·), Y (·), Z(·, ·)) ∈ L2F [0, T ]×M
2[0, T ], and we
can define a map Θ : L2F [0, T ]×M
2[0, T ]→ L2F [0, T ] ×M
2[0, T ] by
Θ(x(·), y(·), z(·, ·)) = (X(·), Y (·), Z(·, ·)),
∀(x(·), y(·), z(·, ·)) ∈ L2F [0, T ] ×M
2[0, T ].
Let (x(·), y(·), z(·, ·)) ∈ L2F [0, T ] ×M
2[0, T ] and
Θ(x(·), y(·), z(·, ·)) = (X(·), Y (·), Z(·, ·)).
As to the first forward equation in (28),
E
∫ T
0
e−βt|X(t)−X(t)|2dt
≤ 2E
∫ T
0
e−βt
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
A1(t, s)[x(s)− x(s)] +B1(t, s)[p(s)− p(s)]ds
∣∣∣∣2 dt
+4E
∫ T
0
e−βt
(∫ t
0
A22(t, s)[x(s) − x(s)]
2ds+
∫ t
0
B22(t, s)[p(s)− p(s)]
2ds
)
dt
≤ 4(M1 +M2)E
∫ T
0
|x(s)− x(s)|2
∫ T
s
e−βtdt
+4(M3 +M4)E
∫ T
0
|p(s)− p(s)|2e2βs
∫ T
s
e−βtdt
≤
C
β
E
∫ T
0
|x(s)− x(s)|2e−βsds+
C
β
E
∫ T
0
|p(s)− p(s)|2eβsds,
where we denote
p(s)− p(s) = EFs
∫ T
s
D1(u, s)[y(u)− y(u)]du + E
Fs
∫ T
s
D2(u, s)[z(u, s) − z(u, s)]du.
Obviously we have
E
∫ T
0
eβt|p(t)− p(t)|2dt
≤ 2M7E
∫ T
0
eβt
∫ T
t
|y(s)− y(s)|2dsdt+ 2M8E
∫ T
0
eβt
∫ T
t
|z(s, t)− z(s, t)|2dsdt
≤
2M7
β
E
∫ T
0
eβs|y(s)− y(s)|2ds+ 2M8E
∫ T
0
eβs|y(s)− y(s)|2ds,
consequently
E
∫ T
0
e−βt|X(t)−X(t)|2dt
≤
C
β
E
∫ T
0
|x(s)− x(s)|2e−βsds+
C
β
E
∫ T
0
|y(s)− y(s)|2eβsds, (29)
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where C depends on Mi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8. As to the other one in (28), for some
p ∈ (1, 2), and 1
p
+ 1
q
= 1,
E
∫ T
0
eβt|Y (t)− Y (t)|2dt
≤ 2E
∫ T
0
eβtφ21(t)|x(t) − x(t)|
2dt+ C(M5 +M7)E
∫ T
0
eβt
∫ T
t
|y(s)− y(s)|2dsdt
+C(M6 +M8)E
∫ T
0
eβt
(∫ T
t
|z(s, t)− z(s, t)|pds
) 2
p
dt
≤
1
2
E
∫ T
0
e−βt|x(t)− x(t)|2dt+
C
β
E
∫ T
0
eβs|y(s)− y(s)|2ds
+C
[
1
β
] 2−p
p
E
∫ T
0
dt
∫ T
t
eβs|z(s, t)− z(s, t)|2ds
≤ C
([
1
β
] 2−p
p
+
1
β
)
E
∫ T
0
eβs|y(s)− y(s)|2ds+
1
2
E
∫ T
0
e−βt|x(t)− x(t)|2dt, (30)
where C depends on Mi, i = 5, 6, 7, 8. Note that here we use the following fact, for
1 < p < 2, and r > 0,[∫ T
t
|z(s, t)− z(s, t)|pds
] 2
p
≤
[∫ T
t
e
−rs 2
2−pds
] 2−p
p
∫ T
t
e
rs 2
p |z(s, t)− z(s, t)|2ds
≤
[
1
r
] 2−p
p
[
2− p
2
] 2−p
p
e
−rt 2
p
∫ T
t
e
rs 2
p |z(s, t)− z(s, t)|2ds.
By (29) and (30) we obtain
E
∫ T
0
e−βt|X(t)−X(t)|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
eβt|Y (t)− Y (t)|2dt
≤
C
β
E
∫ T
0
|x(s)− x(s)|2e−βsds+
1
2
E
∫ T
0
e−βt|x(t)− x(t)|2dt
+C
([
1
β
] 2−p
p
+
1
β
)
E
∫ T
0
eβs|y(s)− y(s)|2ds,
where C depends on Mi(i = 1, 2 · · · 8). So we can choose a suitable β such that the
mapping Θ is contracted and the result holds naturally. ✷
Suppose G = 0, R11 > 0 and R22 < 0, then R
−1 exists which is expressed by
R−1(t) =
[
A−1(t) −A−1(t)R12(t)R
−1
22 (t)
−B−1(t)R21(t)R
−1
11 (t) B
−1(t)
]
,
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where A(t) = R11(t)−R12(t)R22(t)R21(t), B(t) = R22(t)−R21(t)R
−1
11 (t)R12(t).More-
over we assumeA−1(t), B−1(t), R11(t) andR22(t) are bounded, thusR(t)
−1 is uniformly
bounded, then (23) can be rewritten as u(t) = −R(t)−1[S(t)X(t)+λ(t)] with t ∈ [0, T ].
After substituting u(t) into (3), (23) and (24), we obtain the following:
X(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
[(A1(t, s)− U1(t, s)R
−1(s)S(s))X(s) − U1(t, s)R
−1(s)λ(s)]ds
+
∫ t
0
[(A2(t, s)− U2(t, s)R
−1(s)S(s))X(s) − U2(t, s)R
−1(s)λ(s)]dW (s),
Y (t) = [Q(t)− ST (t)R−1(t)S(t)]X(t) − ST (t)R−1(t)λ(t) +
∫ T
t
A1(s, t)Y (s)ds
+
∫ T
t
A2(s, t)Z(s, t)ds −
∫ T
t
Z(t, s)dW (s),
λ(t) = EFt
∫ T
t
[
UT1 (s, t)Y (s) + U
T
2 (s, t)Z(s, t)
]
ds,
(31)
where Ui(t, s) = (Bi(t, s), Ci(t, s)) (i = 1, 2).
The preceding theorem implies that if [Q(t) − ST (t)R−1(t)S(t)] satisfies certain
condition, then (31) admits a unique M-solution (X,Y,Z, λ), thereby the following
result is straightforward.
Theorem 5.2 Let (H1) hold, [Q(t)−ST (t)R−1(t)S(t)] < 12e
−βt, where β is a constant
depending on the upper boundary of the coefficients in the game problem, moreover,
R−1(t) is bounded, then (31) admits a unique M-solution (X,Y,Z, λ). Furthermore, if
(20) and (21) hold, then the quadratic integral game admits an open-loop saddle point
û, and it admits a representation, u(t) = −R(t)−1[S(t)X(t) + λ(t)].
5.2 Some furthermore considerations on stochastic integral games
In this subsection, we would like to give some furthermore considerations along the
routine above. As to the case of G 6= 0, if we define u(t) as u(t) = −R−1(t)λ(t), then
(3), (23) and (24) can be rewritten as
X(t) = ϕ(t)−
∫ t
0
U1(t, s)R
−1(s)λ(s)ds −
∫ t
0
U2(t, s)R
−1(s)λ(s)dW (s)
+
∫ t
0
A1(t, s)X(s)ds +
∫ t
0
A2(t, s)X(s)dW (s),
Y (t) = Q(t)X(t)− S(t)TR−1(t)λ(t) +AT1 (T, t)GX(T ) +
∫ T
t
A1(s, t)Y (s)ds
+AT2 (T, t)θ(t) +
∫ T
t
A2(s, t)Z(s, t)ds −
∫ T
t
Z(t, s)dW (s),
λ(t) = EFt [UT1 (T, t)GX(T ) + U
T
2 (T, t)θ(t)] + S(t)X(t)
+EFt
∫ T
t
[
UT1 (s, t)Y (s) + U
T
2 (s, t)Z(s, t)
]
ds,
(32)
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where GX(T ) = EGX(T ) +
∫ T
0 θ(s)dW (s). Obviously (32) is coupled FBSVIE. In
some special case, for example, S(t) = 0, R is uniform positive, Q and G are non-
negative, then the above FBSVIE (32) admits a unique M-solutions, see p.75 in [27].
However, as to the general case, the solvability problem is still a question for us to
endeavor to overcome. One main technical obstacle is how to deal with the appearance
of GX(T ) in the second equation, nonetheless, it is just the reason, we believe, that the
problem has certain relations with the solvability for some stochastic Fredholm-Volterra
integral equation. To get some feeling about this, Let us consider a special case below.
We assume that all the coefficients aforementioned are deterministic, Ai(t, s) = 0,
(i = 1, 2), ϕ(·) = ϕ1(t) +
∫ t
0 l(t, s)dW (s), ϕ1 and l are deterministic functions. In
such special setting, Y (t) = Q(t)X(t) − ST (t)R−1(t)λ(t), t ∈ [0, T ], and Z(t, s) = 0,
0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T. Due to the martingale representation theorem, there must exists a
unique process π, such that
λ(t) = Eλ(t) +
∫ t
0
π(t, s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ], (33)
X(t) = EX(t) +
∫ t
0
K(t, s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ], (34)
thus we can express Z(t, s), (t, s) ∈ ∆ by
Z(t, s) = Q(t)K(t, s)− ST (t)R−1(t)π(t, s).
On the other hand,
GX(T ) = Gϕ(T ) −
∫ T
0
GU1(T, s)R
−1(s)λ(s)ds −
∫ T
0
GU2(T, s)R
−1(s)λ(s)dW (s),
(35)
then substitute (35) into GX(T ) = EGX(T ) +
∫ T
0 θ(s)dW (s) and by stochastic Fubini
theorem, we have
θ(s) = −
∫ T
s
GU1(T, u)R
−1(u)π(u, s)du −GU2(T, s)R
−1(s)λ(s) + l(T, s).
Similarly we get
K(t, s) = −
∫ t
s
U1(t, u)R
−1(u)π(u, s)du − U2(t, s)R
−1(s)λ(s) + l(t, s).
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Then put the expression of X and Y into the third equation of (32) we have
λ(t) = Σ1(t) + E
Ft
∫ T
0
Σ2(t, s)λ(s)ds + E
Ft
∫ T
0
Σ3(t, s)λ(s)dW (s)
+EFt
∫ T
t
Σ4(t, s)π(s, t)ds + E
Ft
∫ T
t
Σ5(t, s)λ(s)ds
+EFt
∫ T
t
Σ6(t, s)λ(s)dW (s) + Σ7(t)λ(t)
+EFt
∫ t
0
Σ8(t, s)λ(s)dW (s) + E
Ft
∫ t
0
Σ9(t, s)λ(s)ds
= Σ1(t) + E
Ft
∫ T
0
Σ′2(t, s)λ(s)ds + E
Ft
∫ T
0
Σ′3(t, s)λ(s)dW (s)
+EFt
∫ T
t
Σ4(t, s)π(s, t)ds + E
Ft
∫ T
t
Σ′5(t, s)λ(s)ds
+EFt
∫ T
t
Σ′6(t, s)λ(s)dW (s) + Σ7(t)λ(t), (36)
where
Σ1(t) = U
T
1 (T, t)Gϕ(T ) +
∫ T
t
UT1 (s, t)Q(s)ϕ(s)ds + S(t)ϕ(t)
+EFt
∫ T
t
[
UT1 (s, t)Q(s)
∫ t
0
l(s, u)dW (u)ds + UT2 (s, t)Q(s)l(s, t)
]
ds
Σ2(t, s) = −GU
T
1 (T, t)U1(T, s)R
−1(s); Σ3(t, s) = −GU
T
1 (T, t)U2(T, s)R
−1(s);
Σ4(t, s) = −U
T
2 (T, t)GU1(T, s)R
−1(s)− UT2 (s, t)S
T (s)R−1(s)
−
∫ T
s
UT2 (u, t)Q(u)U1(u, s)duR
−1(s);
Σ5(t, s) = −
∫ T
s
UT1 (u, t)Q(u)U1(u, s)duR
−1(s)− UT1 (s, t)S(s)R
−1(s);
Σ6(t, s) = −
∫ T
s
UT1 (u, t)Q(u)U2(u, s)duR
−1(s);
Σ7(t, s) = −U
T
2 (T, t)GU2(T, t)R
−1(t)−
∫ T
t
UT2 (s, t)Q(s)U2(s, t)dsR
−1(t);
Σ8(t, s) = −
∫ T
t
UT1 (u, t)Q(u)U2(u, s)duR
−1(s)− S(t)U2(t, s)R
−1(s);
Σ9(t, s) = −
∫ T
t
UT1 (u, t)Q(u)U1(u, s)duR
−1(s)− S(t)U1(t, s)R
−1(s);
Σ′2(t, s) = Σ2(t, s) + Σ9(t, s); Σ
′
3(t, s) = Σ3(t, s) + Σ8(t, s);
Σ′5(t, s) = Σ5(t, s)− Σ9(t, s); Σ
′
6(t, s) = Σ6(t, s)− Σ8(t, s).
We can denote (36) as a linear BSFVIE. To sum up,
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Theorem 5.3 Let all the coefficients are deterministic, Ai(t, s) = 0, i = 1, 2, ϕ(t) =
ϕ1(t)+
∫ t
0 l(t, s)dW (s), ϕ1 and l are deterministic functions, R
−1(t) exists and bounded.
If (36) admits a solution λ, furthermore, we assume (20) and (21) hold, then the
quadratic integral game admits an open-loop saddle point û, and it admits a represen-
tation û(t) = −R−1(t)λ(t).
More specially, suppose that U2 = 0, then the preceding BSFVIE (36) becomes
λ(t) = Σ1(t) + E
Ft
∫ T
0
Σ′′2(t, s)λ(s)ds + E
Ft
∫ t
0
Σ′′9(t, s)λ(s)ds, (37)
where Σ′′2(t, s) = Σ2(t, s) + Σ5(t, s) and Σ
′′
9(t, s) = Σ9(t, s) − Σ5(t, s). Equation (37) is
a forward stochastic Fredholm-Volterra integral equation (SFVIE for short), thereby
under some assumptions the above SFVIE admits a unique solution λ, see [20], [19] and
the reference cited therein. Next we will present a example to show the application of
the above results.
Let us consider a stochastic delay equation of the form
dX(t) =
[
A′1(t)X(t) +A
′
2(t)X(t− h) +
∫ t
t−h
A′0(t, s)X(s)ds +B
′
1(t)u1(t)
+B′2(t)u1(t− h) + C
′
1(t)u2(t) + C
′
2(t)u2(t− h)
]
+D′(t)dW (t), (38)
with t ∈ [0, T ] where X(t) = k(t) with t ∈ [−h, 0], A′j, B
′
i, C
′
i, D
′ and k are bounded
deterministic functions, (i = 1, 2, j = 0, 1, 2), B′2 ≡ 0, C
′
2 ≡ 0 for t < h, the delay h > 0.
Notice that when A′0 ≡ 0, D
′ ≡ 0 and we consider the system in a deterministic setting,
then (38) will degenerate into the one in Section 7 of [29]. It was shown in [11], see also
[16], that this type of delay equation can be written in the following equivalent form:
X(t) = X0(t) +
∫ t
0
[K1(t, s)u1(s) +K2(t, s)u2(s)]ds +
∫ t
0
Φ(t, s)D′(s)dW (s) (39)
where
X0(t) = Φ(t, 0)k(0) +
∫ 0
−h
[
Φ(t, s+ h)A′2(s+ h) +
∫ h
0
Φ(t, u)A′0(u, s)du
]
k(s)ds,
K1(t, s) = Φ(t, s)B
′
1(s)+Φ(t, s+h)B
′
2(s+h), K2(t, s) = Φ(t, s)C
′
1(s)+Φ(t, s+h)C
′
2(s+
h), and Φ is the transition function:
∂Φ
∂t
(t, s) = A′1(t)Φ(t, s) +A
′
2(t)Φ(t− h, s) +
∫ t
t−h
A′0(t, u)Φ(u, s)du
with t ∈ [0, T ], Φ(s, s) = 1 and Φ(t, s) = 0 with t < 0. Obviously (39) is a simple
form of the forward equation in (32). In this case, ϕ1(t) = X0(t), l(t, s) = Φ(t, s)D
′(s),
U1 = (K1,K2), then we get
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Theorem 5.4 Let the dynamic system is described by a stochastic delay equation (38),
and the cost functional is defined by (4), R−1 is bounded. If the SFVIE (37) admits a
solution, furthermore, (20) and (21) hold, then the quadratic integral game admits an
open-loop saddle point û, and it admits a representation û(t) = −R−1(t)λ(t).
Furthermore, by assuming S(t) = 0, R12 = R21 = 0, we can obtain one express for
the saddle point by
u1(t) = −R
−1
11 (t)
[
K1(T, t)E
FtGX(T ) + EFt
∫ T
t
K1(s, t)Q(s)X(s)ds
]
, t ∈ [0, T ],
u2(t) = −R
−1
22 (t)
[
K2(T, t)E
FtGX(T ) + EFt
∫ T
t
K2(s, t)Q(s)X(s)ds
]
, t ∈ [0, T ].
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